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PREDATORY PRICING IN THE CANADIAN CONTEXT
KARA BEITEd

ABSTRACT

Predat01y pricing is one of the most debated aspects ofantitrust legislation and theory. Economic scholars dispute its existence, and the methods for its detection are the subject of ongoing debate. Consequently,
the regulation of this type of anticompetitive behaviour has developed
sign?ficantly over the past thirty years. The cases and Guidelines reveal
behaviour as predation. The
a care.fit! approach taken to
need to ensure that legitimate forms of competition are not penalized is
integral to the success ofthe Competition Act and to the attainment o.f its
enumerated purposes.

I. INTRODUCTION

Antitrust legislation requires the cooperation of economic theory and
legal discourse. Nowhere is this more apparent than with respect to
predatory pricing. Debate and discussion regarding the proper legal
stance on this issue has gone on for decades, with academics and
economists arguing amongst each other through their various publications. The underlying question is whether predatory pricing should be
the subject of regulation. Opponents to its presence in antitrust legislation argue that, if it exists at all, it is so rare and difficult to detect that
any attempts would be fruitless. Worse, they contend that an attempt to
regulate would actually harm competition. Legitimate and desirable
forms of competition would be identified as predatory behaviour and
subsequently punished. Proponents of predatory pricing provisions art
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gue that, although rare, predation can and does occur in the market
place. In order to protect healthy competition, rogue firms engaged in
the practice must be identified and others dissuaded from attempting
such a strategy.
Based on these economic debates, Canadian legislators have identified predation as a practice requiring regulation. The difficulty rests in
finding a definition which captures predatory behaviour, while recognizing legitimate competition for what it is. The discussion that follows
will focus on how antitrust regulators and the comis have defined
predation, and how effective these Canadian regulations have been to
date. A reflection of the caselaw and the Competition Bureau's Guidelines will reveal a reluctance to label price-cutting as predato1y, except
in the most obvious of cases. This caution shows a respect for the
purposes underlying the Competition Act, and a desire to prevent government regulation from having the very opposite effects of those
intended.

II.

PURPOSES OF THE COMPETITION ACT

The purposes of the Competition Act are set out in s. 1 of the statute:
The purpose of this Act is to maintain and encourage competition in
Canada in order to promote the efficiency and adaptability of the
Canadian economy, in order to expand opportunities for Canadian
participation in world markets while at the same time recognizing the
role offoreign competition in Canada, in order to ensure that small and
medium-sized enterprises have an equitable opportunity to participate
in the Canadian economy and in order to provide consumers with
competitive prices and product choices. 1

Of these four main purposes, the final one is often considered the most
important. It is also the purpose which underlies the regulation of
predatory pricing.

' Competition Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 19 (2nd Supp.), s. l.
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III.

DEFINITION OF CLASSIC AND STRATEGIC PREDATION

For the purposes of this discussion and the analysis contained herein, the
definition of classic predation adopted by the Canadian Competition
Bureau will be used as a starting point. The Predatory Pricing Guidelines define the practice as "a situation where a dominant firm charges
low prices over a long enough period of time so as to drive a competitor
from the market or deter others from entering and then raises prices to
recoup its losses." 2 Central to this definition is firm dominance in the
market and the potential for future recoupment of losses. 3
The following analysis will deal almost exclusively with classic
predation. Strategic predation has yet to find a prominent place in
Canadian law and jurisprudence, and for those reasons is outside the
parameters of this discussion. It should be remembered, however, that
the adoption of amended Guidelines for Illegal Trade Practices, discussed in more detail below, may make strategic predation a relevant
topic for future examination.

IV.

ECONOMIC THEORY UNDERLYING PREDATORY PRICING

While there is insufficient space to do justice to the economic theories
surrounding the phenomenon of predatory pricing, a brief overview will
be useful to contextualize the later discussion. The two leading disciplines of economic theory, referred to as the Chicago and Harvard

J. A. VanDuzer and G. Paquet (Industry Canada-Competition Bureau), Anticompetitive
Pricing Practices and the Competition Act: TheoJJ' Law and Practice (Ottawa: Minister of
Public Works and Government Services, 1999) at 9 [VanDuzer & Paquet].
3 Strategic predation, as defined in academic literature, is intended to deter potential entrants in
a market, to discipline established rivals in the market, or perhaps simply to gain a reputation
for the predator. If a dominant firm establishes a reputation of incurring significant losses in
order to drive down the value or hurt its rivals, those rivals may become more timid in their
future pricing strategies. In this scenario, future recoupment of losses through the imposition
of monopoly-level prices is less important. The predator's goal is to ensure their continued
dominance of the market, and to prevent to future erosion of profits. See Richard A. Posner,
"The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis" (1979) 127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 925 at 932 [Posner,
"Chicago School"].

2
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Schools, disagree on whether predatory pricing exists as a real practice
in the market place.
The Chicago School approaches antitrust economic analysis according to its traditional "laissez-faire" stance, and argues that predatory
pricing is not a viable or rational business strategy and for this reason
will seldom, if ever, occur. To regulate and enforce prohibitions on the
practice would have the negative effect of capturing price cuts which are
pro-competitive and which generally benefit consumers. These conclusions are based largely on basic economic theories of supply and demand, and their relationship to price changes. Robert Bork is particularly apt at using this relationship to demonstrate that, should a dominant firm engage in predatory price-cutting, it will suffer from greater
losses than its intended victim, and it will be unable to later recoup these
losses. 4 Because firms are generally believed to be profit-maximizing,
the inability to recoup losses will dissuade the rational firm from engaging in predation. 5
The Harvard School is far more likely to see predation as a real
threat to healthy competition. Their economic analysis, which has presented a direct challenge to that of Chicagoans, argues that despite its
rare occurrence, predation should be a concern for antitrust regulators.
The debate between advocates of the Harvard School, ignited by the
seminal miicle by Areeda and Turner, 6 has centred largely on the proper
method of identification. As will become clear throughout the discussion that follows, this is a debate which continues to this day. Areeda
and Turner support a definition which identifies pricing as predatory
when it falls below marginal cost. At this level, the firm is selling their
product at a loss, and is wasting social resources, given that the cost of
production exceeds the value of the finished product. Most importantly,
however, pricing below marginal cost "greatly increases the possibility
that rivalry will be extinguished or prevented for reasons unrelated to
4

Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itse(f, (New York: Basic
Books, Inc., 1978) at 145-153 [Bork]; for a more complete analysis of the Chicagoan position
on predatory pricing see Donald G. Mcfetridge, "Predatory and Discriminatory Pricing" in
Frank Mathewson, Michael Trebilcock & Michael Walker eds., The Law and Economics of
Competition Policy (Vancouver: The Fraser Institute 1990) 71 [Mcfetridge] and Frank H.
Easterbrook, "Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies" (1981) 48 U. Chi. L. Rev. 263.
5
Posner, "Chicago School", supra note 3 at 928.
6
Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, "Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section
2 of the Sherman Act" (1975) 88 Harv. L. Rev. 697, [Areeda & Turner, "Predatory Pricing"].
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the efficiency of the monopolist."7 Another prominent economist has
suggested that this definition is too narrow to capture all predatory
behaviour. Douglas Greer advocates a more inclusive definition of
predatory pricing. 8 According to this standard, any price below average
total cost should be looked at with suspicion:
!fa firm's price falls below average total cost ... the firm may continue
to produce and sell in the short run if price is above its average variable
cost, but in the long run, a price below average total cost will cause the
firm to go out of business ... a predator could succeed in driving
equally efficient rivals from the field yet escape detection under the
Areeda-Turner rule ... 9

An additional requisite element under Greer's approach is a predatory
intent. This requirement distinguishes cases such as that described
above from situations in which a firm may be selling below average total
costs due to legitimate business considerations. 10 This requirement will
be discussed in more detail throughout the discussion of predatory
pricing regulation in Canada.

1. Summary of the Economic Rationale

Despite inspiring a plethora of debate and discussion on the issue,
Areeda and Turner did not directly respond to the criticisms put forward
by Bork and other Chicagoans. Is there any reason to create a workable
definition of predatory pricing? Does it, or could it, exist in the market
place? A recent paper commissioned by the Canadian Competition
Bureau, provides a useful summary of the arguments supporting the
existence of predatory pricing within the market place, thus justifying its
prohibition. The paper noted that many economists and academics who
support some sort of prohibition of predation base their arguments on:
models which acknowledge that information and capital markets are
not perfectly efficient. The predator and the victim will not have

Ibid. at 712.
Douglas F. Greer, "A Critique of Areeda and Turner's Standard for Predatory Practices"
( 1979) 24 Antitrust Bull. 233 at 234-35 [Greer, "Critique"].
9
Ibid at 240.
10 Greer, "Critique", supra note 8 at 235.

7

8
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complete information regarding each other and the victim may not
have access to sufficient capital to survive the period of predation. 11

This implies that some of the assumptions which are central to the
arguments presented by Chicagoans may be incorrect. The importance
of these two factors, full access to information and financial markets, to
a rational theory of predatory pricing is emphasized by Mcfetridge, who
stated that "In the absence of financial asymmetries (deep pockets), full
knowledge is fatal to classical predation." 12 In the absence of these
assumptions about the market, the argument that predation is always an
irrational strategy cannot be sustained. 13

V.

APPLICATION OF CANADIAN PREDATORY PRICING LAWS

1. THE

PREDATORY PRICING TRILOGY

The Canadian jurisprudence concerning predatory pricing is limited to
three cases which were brought under s. 33A(l )( c) of the Combines
Investigations Act (later renumbered as s. 34(1)(c)). This provision is
identical to that found today in paragraph 50(1 )( c) of the Competition
Act. 14 Each of these cases will be considered, especially with respect to
the court's view of which practices constitute predatory behaviour
versus those which are seen as healthy competition.

VanDuzer & Paquet, supra note 2 at 9 .
McFetridge, supra note 4 at 77.
13
This conclusion is based on the academic assessment of classic predation. The presence of
strategic considerations, which are largely outside the scope of this paper, further support the
conclusion that predation is a rational business strategy.
14
Section 50 of the Competition Act (R.S.C. 1985, c. C-34, s. 50; l 999, c. 31, s. 50(F).) states:
50. ( l) Every one engaged in a business who
(c) engages in a policy of selling products at prices unreasonably
low, having the effect or tendency of substantially lessening competition or eliminating a competitor, or designed to have that effect, is
guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term
not exceeding two years.
11

12
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i. R. v. The Producers Dairy Ltd.
The first case of predation was brought in the mid-1960s, and concerned
the competition practices within the Ottawa dairy industry. R. v. The
Producers Dairy Ltd. 15 was brought in response to a significant decrease
in the wholesale price at which Producers sold their product to retail
stores. The case considered what constituted a "policy" of selling pursuant to the Combines Investigations Act. The Court of Appeal described
the meaning of the provision by stating that it required "something more
than ... the adoption of a temporary expedient to meet an aggressive,
competitive move aimed directly at an important customer.... " 16
Prior to this prosecution, similar allegations against one of Producers' competitors had been dismissed after the Commission distinguished
their actions from those of Producers as being "purely defensive and
self-protecting." 17 The Court of Appeal ultimately dismissed the case
against Producers for the same reasons. This is the first indication that
the courts would consider whether the challenged price-cut was aggressive or defensive as relevant to finding the defendant guilty of predation.

ii. R. v. Hoffinann-La Roche Ltd

The second case, R. v. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd, 18 was brought in
response to Hoffman-La Roche offering free valium tablets to hospitals
for two six-month periods when faced with a new entrant to the market.
The case is significant as it is the first conviction under the predatory
pricing provisions, and because it provides a full analysis of the elements of the offence. 19 The comi identified these elements as: being
engaged in a business; being engaged in a policy of selling articles;
unreasonably low prices; and an anticompetitive effect of the policy or
an anticompetitive mens rea. 20 Although there was contention regarding
(1966), 50 C.P.R. (2d) 265 (Ont. C.A.) [Producers Daily].
Ibid. at 271.
17
Donald G. Mcfetridge & Stanley Wong, "Predatory Pricing In Canada: The Law and the
Economics" (1985) 63 Can. Bar Rev. 685 at 689 [Mcfetridge & Wong, "Predatory Pricing"].
18
(1980), 109 D.L.R. (3d) 5 (Ont. H.C.J.) [Hoffinan-La Roche].
19
Mcfetridge & Wong, "Predatory Pricing", supra note 17 at 690.
20
Ho.ffinan-La Roche, supra note 18 at 34-46.
15

16

210 - DALHOUSIE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES

whether Hoffman-La Roche was actually engaged in a policy of selling
goods, 21 the resolution of the case ultimately rested on the definition of
"unreasonably low" accepted by the court.
In adopting a definition, Linden J. noted that "economic theory
cannot control the legal determination of reasonableness, but it is certainly relevant. " 22 This view has support in the literature, where economists have noted that economic definitions are "not very helpful in
describing predatory behaviour, and not easily translated into a legal
rule ... [An economic definition] would be of little value to judges, and
would offer little guidance to dominant finns as to how to avoid prosecution."23 What was required was an adaptation of economic theory
into a workable, easily understood legal definition.
The legal definition resulting from the case is based in part on
economic theory and in part on what the court believed to be the aims of
Parliament in enacting the provision. A declaration of the illegality of all
prices which fell below cost was explicitly rejected. In dismissing the
definition supported by many economists, most notably Areeda and
Turner, Linden J. stated that:
If Parliament had intended that all sales below cost be considered
unreasonable, it could have defined the term in that way. It did not.
Parliament used the phrase "unreasonably low", a more flexible provision, in order to permit the Courts to assess all of the circumstances of
sales before concluding whether the prices were unreasonably low. 24

Context, therefore, is vital when determining if predation has occurred.
Four factors were identified as being relevant to the court's analysis.
The first factor considered was the difference between production
cost and selling price. The court stated that a price above cost can never
be unreasonable, and therefore will not be considered predatory. When
price falls below cost, the greater the disparity between the two will
increase the likelihood that the price will be viewed as being unreasonThe defence argued that because Hoffman-La Roche was not selling valium, but was
actually giving it away, their actions did not fall within the spectre of the statute. Linden J.
rejected this view, stating "even when goods are given away totally free by a producer to a
customer in a commercial context, this is still a "sale" in the sense that word is used in this
section." (Hoffinan-la Roche, supra note 18 at 37).
22
Hoffinan-la Roche, supra note 18 at 38.
23
George A. Hay, "Economics of Predatory Pricing" (1982) 51 Antitrust L.J. 361at362.
24
Hoffinan-la Roche, supra note 18 at 38.
21
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ably low. 25 The length of time during which the goods were sold at the
questionable price was the second relevant factor. The longer the period,
the more likely that the prices were unreasonably low. Thirdly, the
reason for the price reduction must be considered. Here, Linden J.
followed the approach advocated in Producers Dairy: "defensive pricecutting is viewed differently than offensive price-cutting ... Competition
is a battle after all, and competitors must be allowed to engage in that
battle, as long as they do so within reason." 26 A price which is set in
response to a competitor's initial price reduction will be seen as a logical
reaction in a competitive market, so long as the decrease is propo1iional
and reasonable. The final factor identified was whether there are any
long-term benefits to be gained by the price reduction. We must assume
that the court is talking about only legitimate long-term market benefits,
given that recoupment after the elimination of rivals is an important
benefit to a predatory firm and central to a successful predatory pricing
strategy.
The court's final area of analysis was with respect to the last element
of the offence: that the policy of selling at the unreasonably low price
had the effect or tendency of substantially lessening competition or
eliminating a rival, or that it was designed to have that effect. The court
referred to this section as the effect and mens rea analysis. Relying on
company records to support its finding that the requisite mens rea was
present in this case, the court nonetheless noted in obiter that the policy
had not had the desired effect. Linden J. stated that, although the only
competitor had been persuaded to temporarily exit the market by
Hoffman-La Roche's actions, this did not necessarily mean that competition had been substantially lessened, or that the competitor had been
permanently eliminated. 27 This notion is revisited in the Predatory Pricing Guidelines. The current thinking on what constitutes a substantial
lessening of competition will be discussed in detail below.

25
26
27

Hc!ffinan-La Roche, supra note 18 at 41-2.
Ho.ffinan-La Roche, supra note I 8 at 42.
Hoffinan-La Roche, supra note I 8 at 46.
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iii. R. v. Consumers Glass Company Ltd. and Portion Packaging.
The final instalment in the trilogy of predatory pricing cases is R. v.
Consumers Glass Company Ltd. and Portion Packaging. 28 The main
issue, like in Hoffman-La Roche, was what constituted "unreasonably
low" prices within the meaning of s. 34(l)(c) of the Act. In deciding on
the appropriate pricing theory to adopt, O'Leary J. concentrated specifically on the Areeda-Tumer test and the Greer test. After hearing the
testimony of both Dr. Turner and Dr. Greer in defence of their respective
theories, O'Leary J. articulated the appropriate considerations for the
specific case before him. He found that, where a market was plagued
with the chronic overcapacity that was demonstrated in this case, any
price which was over average variable cost could not be considered
predatory:
Dr. Greer assumes that ... there is no predation while the alleged
predator is loss minimizing in the short run. Dr. Turner is of course of
the same view ... the accused in this case never sold at predatoty, that is
to say unreasonably low, prices, because at all times they were selling
so as to make the greatest contribution to ... [the company's} fixed
overhead. 29

While seeming to accept the Areeda-Tumer standard as the default
position in Canada, O'Leary J. declined to decide which test should be
generally adopted. It was unnecessary for him to do so for the disposition of this case - under either test, Portion could not have been found to
be engaged in predatory behaviour. His interest in Greer's alternative
test and his extensive comment on the single American case that rejected the Areeda-Tumer standard in favour of Greer's (Transamerica
Computer Co. v. IBM Corp. )30 suggests that he was perhaps leaning in
that direction. Moreover, after stating that it was unnecessary to choose
between the two tests, he stated that:
if! were to adopt the view that any price below average cost is suspect,
and look to the intent with which that price was adopted, I would still
conclude that the accused did not adopt such a price in order to lessen
competition or eliminate Amhil as a competitor but simply to minimize its losses and so the price charged was reasonable. 31
28
29
30
31

(1981), 124 D.L.R. (3d) 274 (Ont. H.C.J.) [Consumers Glass].
Ibid. at 297.
(1979), 2 Trade Cases 79, 618.
Consumers Glass, supra note 28 at 300.
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While the Areeda-Tumer standard had to this point been the de facto test
applied in Canada, undoubtedly in part due to its wide adoption in other
jurisdictions, the approach advocated by Greer emphasizing intent and
market circumstances, was clearly gaining prominence.

2. The Predatory Pricing Guidelines

The purpose of the predatory pricing provisions is consistent with the
purposes of the Act: to protect competition in Canada. In the case of
predatory pricing, the danger rests in the effects of anticompetitive
pricing. While low prices seem intuitively like a good thing, in certain
circumstances they can have a negative impact on both the market and
consumers. It is these situations where the predatory pricing provisions
are aimed: "Although such pricing behaviour does confer some benefits
to the purchasers in the market during the period of predation, those
benefits will be transitory or short-term, and eventually outweighed by
increased costs during the period of recoupment." 32
Due largely to the limited case law and the lack of guidance which it
provided to competitive firms, the Competition Bureau published
Predatory Pricing Guidelines in 1992. The Guidelines are intended to
provide the general approach taken to the investigation of predatory
pricing complaints, but should not been viewed as binding on the
Bureau, Attorney General, or the courts. 33 It is intended to provide some
guidance so that firms may evaluate the risk that their behaviour will fall
within the provisions of the Competition Act and thus be criminal. The
Guidelines recognize that predatory pricing, as defined, will be a relatively rare occurrence. That said, the Competition Commissioner receives a disproportionately large number of complaints (few of which
lead to official inquiries, and even less are subsequently referred to the
Attorney General), and therefore requires a method of assessing complaints in order to "distinguish predatory pricing from otherwise vigorous and desirable price competition."34 As will be seen more clearly

Competition Bureau, Predatory Pricing Enforcement Guidelines (Ottawa: Competition
Bureau, 1992) at Preface [Competition Bureau, Guidelines].
33
Ibid.
3" Competition Bureau, Guidelines, supra note 32 at Part 2.1.
32
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below, the ability to recoup losses after a period of predation has been
central to the Canadian approach, and thus consistent with the economic
rationale underlying the existence of predatory pricing. Absent the
ability to recoup losses, predatory pricing is irrational behaviour which
would not be encountered in the market.
Despite the minimal amount of case law available, the Bureau
considered those cases that had been decided under the predatory pricing provision when drafting the Guidelines, particularly the Hoffinan-La
Roche and Consumers Glass cases. The four elements of the offence
which the Crown must establish are that the predator is "engaged in a
business"; the prices at issue are "unreasonably low"; those prices must
be part of a "policy of selling"; and they must have the effect, or be
designed to have the effect, of "substantially lessening competition or
eliminating a competitor." That said, the Guidelines make it clear that
the threshold issue is whether the prices are "unreasonably low." 35

i. "Unreasonably Low" Pricing

The reasonableness of any price cannot be dete1mined based solely on
the cost formulas debated by Areeda and Turner, et al. Many of the
variables recognized by the Bureau as being factors significant to this
threshold issue are taken from the jurisprudence:
was the alleged predator responding to price cuts of a rival firm, or did
the alleged predator initiate them? How long were the prices in effect
in the market? Was there excess chronic capacity in the industry
resulting in firms offering prices which could fairly be described as
loss-minimizing in an effort to remain viable and retain market
share? 36

With these contextual issues in mind, the analysis into whether the
prices at issue are unreasonably low is done in two parts. The first step
considers the market in which the alleged predator does business. At this
stage of the analysis, market dominance is important. Theoretical analysis of predation demonstrates that the practice is only possible if the
alleged predator enjoys market dominance. Chicagoans, while dismiss35

36

Competition Bureau, Guidelines, supra note 32 at Part I .4.
Competition Bureau, Guidelines, supra note 32 at Part 2.2.
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ing that predatory pricing could or would occur frequently enough to
warrant prohibitions, concede that if it were to occur only a dominant
finn would be in a position to attempt it. As the Guidelines state, "By its
very nature, price predation presumes that the alleged predator possesses sufficient market power to unilaterally impose price levels on the
market long enough to harm its rivals financially, and to recoup any
losses incurred in the process once its rivals have been forced to exit the
market." 37 To determine market dominance, the Bureau considers the
concentration of the market. This requires an initial definition of the
market in which the alleged predator operates, followed by a determination of that market's concentration: "It is unlikely that an alleged predator with a market share of less than 35 percent would have the ability to
unilaterally affect industry pricing."38 With a market share of less than
35 percent, the alleged predator would be unable to force other competitors to lower their own prices. Moreover, without a rather significant
difference in size between the alleged predator and alleged victim, the
victim would be in a position to wait out the predation period.
The next factor under the market analysis is the conditions of entry.
This is really an inquiry into whether the alleged predator will be able to
recoup losses after driving competitors from the market. It is this precondition which Chicagoans believe will make predation an irrational
strategy, as a firm's ability to recoup was doubted. Likewise, recent
literature notes that "the recoupment requirement was used to screen out
cases where predation appeared unprofitable and hence irrational." 39
The Bureau considers factors noted by the academics, including regulations affecting entry into the market and sunk costs, but neglects to
consider the symmetry between entry and exit barriers. Barriers to entry
will not only prevent new firms from entering the market, thereby
allowing the alleged predator to recoup losses from the predation period,
but will also act as barriers to exit which will dissuade the alleged victim
from exiting the market in a timely fashion. The disregard for the effect
of exit barriers may be due to the definition relied on by the Guideline
with respect to this analysis:

37

Competition Bureau, Guidelines, supra note 32 at Part 2.2.1.1.
Competition Bureau, Guidelines, supra note 32 at Part 2.2.1.1.
39
Patrick Bolton, Joseph F. Brodley & Michael H. Riordan, "Predatory Pricing: Strategic
Theory and Legal Policy," (2000) 88 Geo. L.J. 2239 at 2263.
38
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the Director tries to determine whether or not attempted recoupment
by the alleged predator, through price increases following the exit of a
rival or rivals, would, within two years, invite entry into the industry
on a sufficient scale to ensure that price increases could not be sustained.40

Thus, because the Commissioner will be looking at whether the predator
will have more than two years in which to recoup losses incurred during
the predation period, the effect of barriers to exit will indirectly be taken
into account.
The second stage of analysis detennines whether prices were unreasonably low and centres on the relationship between price and cost. The
Bureau adopts the rationale hinted at in the Consumers Glass case, a
combination of the Areeda-Turner and Greer rules. Areeda and Turner
use average marginal cost (substituting average variable cost for the
sake of convenience) as a litmus to identify prices which are predato1y.
Likewise, the Bureau will view a price which is below the average
variable cost as unreasonably low, unless there is a justification for such
a low price. 41 Greer, on the other hand, advocates a finding of predation
where costs are below the firm's average total costs. The Guidelines
state that no price above a finn's average total cost will be regarded as
unreasonably low. 42 Thus, prices which are above average variable cost
but below average total cost fall within a grey area in Canada. Whether
prices within this grey range will be viewed as unreasonably low will
depend on the circumstances. The Guidelines note that declining demand or substantial excess capacity in the market may justify prices
within this range. 43
An additional element is required under the Canadian test: the policy
of selling at the unreasonably low price must have the effect or the
tendency to substantially lessen competition or eliminate a competitor,
or be designed to have that effect. Thus the Canadian test allows for
defences even after a finding that prices are unreasonably low: that the
pricing behaviour did not have the effect required, and that there was no
predatory intent. Again, the Guidelines seem to favour the Greer approach as opposed to that of Areeda and Turner, who explicitly reject
4

° Competition Bureau, Guidelines, supra note 32 at Part 2.2. I .2.

41

42
43

Competition Bureau, Guidelines, supra note 32 at Part 2.2.2.
Competition Bureau, Guidelines, supra note 32 at Part 2.2.2.
Competition Bureau, Guidelines, supra note 32 at Part 2.2.2.
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any defences once it is established that the pnce is below average
variable cost. 44
Once it has been established that the prices of an alleged predator are
unreasonably low, and that there is a policy of selling goods at this
unreasonably low price, 45 the analysis turns to their purpose and effect.

ii. Competitive Impact
Paragraph 50(1 )( c) of the Competition Act makes it clear that either an
anticompetitive effect or an anticompetitive purpose will lead to a
finding that a firm has engaged in predatory behaviour, where the other
elements of the offence have been satisfied. Accordingly, the statute is
concerned with three scenarios, only one of which must be established
for a conviction: "circumstances where the objectionable pricing
behaviour has already brought about demonstrable and measurable
harmful economic effects", circumstances "where the objectionable
pricing behaviour has not been in place for a period of time sufficient to
yet fully bring about these effects," and circumstances where "there is
evidence available with respect to harmful design or intent of the alleged
predator. " 46
There are actually five elements within the competitive impact
analysis: whether a substantial lessening of competition has occurred;
whether the elimination of a competitor has occurred; whether the
behaviour would have a tendency to substantially lessen competition;
whether the behaviour would have a tendency to eliminate a competitor;
and whether there is evidence that, even if unsuccessful, the alleged
predator cut prices with the intention of substantially lessening competition or eliminating a competitor. 47

Although, Areeda and Turner only directly consider the defences of promotional pricing and
meeting the competition. See Areeda & Turner, "Predatory Pricing", supra note 6 at 715.
45 Factors relevant to the determination of whether there is a "policy of selling" include
whether the prices were in place for a short period of time, whether they are defensive
reactions to the pricing initiatives of competitor firms, and whether they are the response to
various random market occurrences. See Competition Bureau, "Guidelines", supra note 32 at
Part 2.3
46 Competition Bureau, Guidelines, supra note 32 at Part 2.4.
47 Competition Bureau, Guidelines, supra note 32 at Part 2.4.
44
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The relevant inquiry to detennine whether a substantial lessening of
competition has occurred is whether the pricing policy had the effect or
tendency to "preserve or add to market power and that there is little
opportunity for competition in the future because entry barriers are
maintained or raised." 48 It is significant that the preservation of market
power is included in this definition. In Hoffman-La Roche, Linden J.
indicated that it was unlikely that the Crown could prove a substantial
lessening of competition, given that only one competitor was forced to
stop competing in the relevant market. Although competition was lessened to a certain degree, he felt this did not necessarily equal a substantial lessening of competition. 49 The Guidelines indicate that this reasoning would not be upheld if that situation were to arise again. HoffmanLa Roche was clearly attempting to preserve its market share, consequently preventing any new entrants into that particular market. The
effect of predatory behaviour in a situation such as this is to create a
barrier to entry.
The elements dealing with the elimination of a competitor are
straightforward. The analysis will consider whether the competitor has
left the market permanently. For this to be established, the Director must
be satisfied that the firm has gone out of business, or is no longer in a
position to prevent the alleged predator from raising prices to an
anticompetitive level. 50 On this issue, the Guidelines are in agreement
with the decision in Hoffman-La Roche. There, Linden J. stated that the
Crown could not establish that the alleged predatory behaviour had
actually eliminated the rival from the market permanently. The firm had
continued to sell small amounts within the relevant market, and
Hoffman-La Roche was not in a position to sell at monopoly-level
prices. 51
The final method of satisfying the competitive impact analysis is
with respect to the intent, or mens rea, of the alleged predator. The
Guidelines note that a number of factors are relevant to this determination, including the magnitude of the price cuts and the losses incurred,
the lack of any justifying reason for the price cuts, and any documents or

48

Competition Bureau, Guidelines, supra note 32 at Part 2.4.
H14finan-la Roche, supra note 18 at 47.
5
° Competition Bureau, Guidelines, supra note 32 at Part 2.4.
51
Ho.ffinan-la Roche, supra note 18 at 4 7.

49
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oral evidence establishing an anticompetitive intent. 52 As advocated by
Greer, any extrinsic evidence will be relevant to the final determination.

iii. Proposed Amendments
In March of 2002, the Competition Bureau released a draft of the
proposed Enforcement Guidelines on Illegal Trade Practices: Unreasonably Low Pricing Policies. These Guidelines, when adopted, will replace the Predatory Pricing Guidelines discussed above. 53 According to
the draft Guidelines, their intention is to update the approach taken by
the Bureau in accordance with changing economic perspectives. Underlying the proposed Guidelines is an increased awareness of strategic
predation, and analysis on this issue has been added throughout the
document. More specifically, there are three main changes from the
existing Predatory Pricing Guidelines: the significance of the ability to
recoup losses, the measure used in the price-cost analysis, and new
guidelines dealing with unreasonably low pricing resulting from market
expansion. 54 Only the first two are relevant to the current analysis.
The ability of an alleged predator to recoup losses has always been
significant to the predatory pricing inquiry. Without this, the practice of
predatory pricing is irrational, and would not be engaged in. Where
recoupment was a threshold issue under the Predatory Pricing Guidelines, it is now considered only in relation to the competitive impacts
analysis. The ability to recoup losses is seen as an indication of market
share and barriers to entry and exit, but is "not a necessary element to be
proven under paragraph ... 50(1)(c)." 55 The relegation of recoupment
from a threshold issue to a position of one of many factors contradicts
the theoretical arguments which consider it as central to the analysis of
classic predation. The proposed Guidelines, however, note a number of
situations in which predation could occur for reasons other than to
ensure future recoupment:
Competition Bureau, Guidelines, supra note 32 at Part 2.4.
Competition Bureau, News Release, "Information" (8 March, 2002) <http://
strategis.ic.gc.ca/SSG/ct0234 I e.html>.
54
Competition Bureau, J/legal Trade Practices: Unreasonably Low Pricing Policies (Draft),
on line: <http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/SSG/I /ctO l l 39e.html> [Competition Bureau, Illegal Trade
Practices].
55
Ibid. at 14.
52

53
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... it may be rational for a firm to adopt a low-pricing policy and
sacrifice present profits in order to preserve the long-term stability of
an existing market structure. Additionally, a low-pricing policy could
assist in establishing an industry standard to exclude others or maintain market control. 56

Implicit in this reasoning is the threat of strategic predation. A firm may
engage in predatory pricing, not to ensure monopoly-level prices in the
future, but to ensure that market share (and consequently profit) is not
eroded in the future. They will not recoup their short-term losses per se,
but future profits will be protected. In that sense, recoupment does
actually occur, in that absent the predatory behaviour, the firm would
likely have seen a future decline in profits.
The second significant change to the existing Guidelines is with
respect to the measure used to determine which prices are "unreasonably low." In place of average variable cost and average total cost, the
Bureau now recognizes avoidable cost as the appropriate measure.
Avoidable costs are defined as "all costs that could have been avoided
by a firm had it chosen not to sell the product(s) in question. In general,
avoidable costs do not include sunk costs." 57 It would seem that avoidable costs include some fixed costs, such as the price and maintenance
of machinery, which are not included in average variable cost. The
difficulty with using this measure arises when courts are unable to
obtain all the information necessary to calculate avoidable cost. This
concern is especially relevant if the firm is engaged in the production of
multiple products. If the courts face this difficulty, expedience will
likely dictate that they use a proxy for avoidable costs, and revert back
to using average variable cost and average total costs.

3. Abuse of Dominance Provisions
The above discussion concerns the criminal prov1s10ns dealing with
predatory pricing. This type of anticompetitive behaviour can also be
dealt with under the abuse of dominance provisions found in paragraph
79 of the Act. As a non-criminal provision, the Commissioner of
56
57

Competition Bureau, 11/ega/ Trade Practices, supra note 54 at 14.
Competition Bureau, 11/ega/ Trade Practices, supra note 54 at 16.
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Competition can make an application for a remedial order from the
Competition Tribunal. Upon receiving an application and being satisfied that the elements of the offence have been established, the Tribunal
is empowered to impose a variety of remedies. In most cases, the
Commissioner will decide at the outset which provision is the most
appropriate venue given the circumstances of the particular case.
Behaviour reviewable under paragraph 79 is very similar to that
which is criminal under paragraph 50. The Abuse of Dominance Guidelines state that:
an abuse occurs when a dominant firm or group of firms engages in
conduct that constitutes exclusionary, disciplinary or predatory
behaviour towards competitors or potential competitors, with the result that competition is prevented or lessened substantially. 58

The elements to be established under this provision are closely related to
those examined with respect to paragraph 50(1 )( c). Likewise, the stated
purpose of the Abuse of Dominance provisions is to ensure that effective competition is allowed to flourish, and not be impeded by
anticompetitive acts of a dominant firm. 59
There are three elements contained within paragraph 79. These will
not be examined in detail, except to the extent that they parallel those
found in paragraph 50. As its name suggests, central to the Abuse of
Dominance provisions is an examination of the market power that is,
the dominance of the finn within the particular market. As is the case
with respect to a predatory pricing analysis, this entails an examination
into existing barriers to entry and the market share enjoyed by a firm.
The market share should be greater than thirty-five percent in order for
the Bureau to continue its investigation; market shares below that level
are not considered "dominant."60
The anticompetitive acts complained of must be the "practice" of the
dominant firm. This is similar to the "policy" of selling at an unreasonably low cost analysis that is undertaken pursuant to paragraph 50( I)( c).
The Guidelines indicate that the definition of "practice" is broader than
that of "policy": "while a practice is normally more than an isolated act,
58 Competition Bureau, Enforcement Guidelines on the Abuse of Dominance Provisions
(Ottawa: Competition Bureau, 2001) at 6 [Competition Bureau, Enforcement Guidelines].
59
Ibid. at 6.
6
° Competition Bureau, Enforcement Guidelines, supra note 58 at 15.
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it may also constitute one occurrence that is sustained and systemic or
that has had a lasting impact on the state of competition." 61 Given the
wide variety of acts covered by this provision, it is foreseeable that a
single act may have long tenn effects on competition, unlike predatory
pricing where unreasonably low price levels would have no significant
impact on competition where they were not prolonged.
The final element under paragraph 79 is the effect of preventing or
lessening competition substantially in a market. As under paragraph 50,
the substantial lessening of competition occurs when a dominant finn
"preserve[ s] or add[ s] to ... [their] market power. " 62
Paragraph 79, therefore, provides an alternative avenue. Which the
Commissioner chooses will depend on circumstances specific to the
case and may include whether the firm has engaged in other
anticompetitive activities or if a more effective remedy may be available
under paragraph 79. 63 A remedy to correct the anticompetitive
behaviour in an expedient manner may be preferable to a criminal action
which would undoubtedly take longer to resolve. An especially important consideration is the strength of the Commissioner's evidence that
predation has occurred. Because paragraph 50 is a criminal provision,
its elements must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt - a burden that
has been difficult to meet in many past antitrust prosecutions.

VI.

CONCLUSION

Predato1y pricing is perhaps one of the most debated issues in antitrust
economics. Its very existence has been disputed, and there is currently
no universal agreement on how to recognize it. That said, the past thirty
years have been witness to significant advances in its understanding.
Courts and tribunals have begun to utilize current economic thinking to
develop a legal standard that is inclusive enough to catch predatory
behaviour, but cautious enough to not impede effective competition.
Chicagoans objected to the regulation of predatory pricing because they
61

62

63

Competition Bureau, E11j(1rce111e11t Guidelines, supra note 58 at 17.
Competition Bureau, Enforcement Guidelines, supra note 58 at 18.
Competition Bureau, Guidelines, supra note 32 at Part 1.2.
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believed the process for identifying it would lead to the
misidentification of legitimate forms of competition. Time has shown
that, not only can predatory behaviour happen in an ever more concentrated marketplace, it can be distinguished from beneficial competition.
Canadian experience provides ample evidence of this. From the hundreds of allegations of predatory pricing, only three cases have progressed to the courts, and of those only one has resulted in a conviction.
This is likely due in part to the alternate civil avenue made available
through paragraph 79 of the Act. But much credit must be given to the
Bureau and to the courts. The ultimate purpose behind prohibiting
predation - to ensure fair competition among all firms - has not been
lost.
Given the results arising from an inquiry into the Canadian experience, it is safe to conclude that the prohibition of predatory pricing is
warranted. Antitrust legislation which purports to protect the competitive process and consumer welfare cannot ignore a practice that has
proven to be a threat to these ideals.

